109. January 9, 2019, Wednesday
108. December 25, 2018, Tuesday
107. December 24, 2018, Monday
106. December 21, 2018, Friday
105. December 21, 2018, Friday
104. December 20, 2018, Thursday
103. December 18, 2018, Tuesday
102. December 18, 2018, Tuesday
101. November 12, 2018, Monday
100. November 2, 2018, Friday
99. October 25, 2018, Thursday
98. September 19, 2018, Wednesday
97. September 3, 2018, Monday
- Speaker: Ms. Wang, Rui (Pennsylvania State University)
- Title: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects under Misreporting
- Time: 14:00--15:30
- Venue: A208
- Chair: Dr. Sun, Xiang
- Abstract: This note characterizes an identified set for local average treatment effect when the treatment is misreported. Compared to a similar paper Ura (2018), it is a strict improvement under some distributions of the outcomes.
108. December 25, 2018, Tuesday
- Speaker: Dr. Cui, Liyuan (City University of Hong Kong)
- Title: 投资者对经济基本面的认知偏差会影响证券价格吗?中美证券市场对比分析
- Time: 10:00--11:30
- Venue: A208
- Chair: Dr. Liu, Cheng
- Abstract: 本文通过放松Lucas(1978)资本资产定价模型的完全理性假设,构建了投资者的经济基本面认知偏差对证券价格影响的计量模型。当投资者主观认知和市场实际运行机制存在偏差时,该模型能较好地解释诸如消费增长率同股权溢价的相关性、累积超额收益等传统资产定价模型无法量化的诸多中国股市难题。本文还推导出了适用于非理性期望的广义矩估计方法(GMM),克服了现有GMM方法只能在完全理性期望下使用的局限性。基于该方法,本文以中国和美国为例,模拟检验了投资主体的不同认知偏差对股价和债券价格的差异性影响程度。结果显示,中美投资者的主观预期形式并不完全相同。美国投资者对经济基本面信息均值的变化反应较敏感;而中国投资者却对经济基本面波动的变化反应较敏感。该结果从认知偏差角度解释了中国股价长期背离经济基本面的现象,为政府规范股票市场的发展,促进股市服务实体经济提供了政策启示。
107. December 24, 2018, Monday
- Speaker: Dr. Li, Bing (Central University of Finance and Economics)
- Title: Supply and demand of media Slant: Big data analysis based on newspaper text
- Time: 14:30--16:00
- Venue: A208
- Chair: Dr. Cui, Jingbo
- Abstract: Media coverage should be fair and objective, but some studies have found that there are some deviations in media coverage in various countries. This deviation comes from the supplier, that is, media coverage reflects the preferences and from the demand side, that is, media coverage tends to cater to reading people's preferences. However, the sources of these two deviations can not be identified at the same time. Based on China's provincial and municipal newspapers, this paper constructs the city media contact index, and combines the data of the floating population survey from 2011 to 2015 and the resume data of provincial Party committee secretaries and governors. Using China's unique media distribution system and the special national conditions of large-scale floating population, this paper identifies the media from both supply and demand aspects. The source of deviation is reported. We find that, on the one hand, the media coverage is influenced by the Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee of the supplier; on the other hand, the demand side is also influenced by the preference of the floating population as a reader group. After the instrumental variables deal with the potential endogenous problems, the results are still robust; we find that the deviations between the supplier and the demander are mutually substituted. After we introducing the cross term between the demand side and supply side, it is find the coefficient is negative, which proves that there are indeed media reports in the supply side and demand side. Trade-off between interests.
106. December 21, 2018, Friday
- Speaker: Dr. Cheng, Chen (Johns Hopkins University)
- Title: Stable Allocations with Network-Based Comparisons
- Time: 15:30--17:00
- Venue: A208
- Chair: Dr. Han, Lining
- Abstract: We consider a model in which an agent’s payoff is based on her (local) ranking, i.e., the ranking of her allocation among her neighbors’ in the network. An allocation is stable if it is not revoked under α-majority voting; that is, there exists no alternative allocation, such that a fraction of at least α of the population have their rankings strictly improved under the alternative. We find a sufficient and necessary condition for a network to permit any stable allocation: the network has an independent set of size at least (1 − α) of the population. A network is more permissive if it permits stable allocation for a larger set of α. We then characterize the size of the largest independent set for Erdős–Rényi random networks, which reflects how permissive a network is: for large enough population, the level of permissibility solely depends on the expected degree. We provide several interesting comparative statics results: more connected networks, more populated networks (with a fixed link probability), or more homophilous networks are less permissive. Given expected degree, whether a network is segregated or integrated would not affect the level of permissibility. We generalize our model to arbitrary blocking coalitions and provide a sufficient and necessary condition for this case. We also extend the model to directed networks.
105. December 21, 2018, Friday
- Speaker: Dr. Xing, Yiqing (Johns Hopkins University)
- Title: Screening with Network Externalities
- Time: 14:00--15:30
- Venue: A208
- Chair: Dr. Xiao, Mingjun
- Abstract: We develop a model in which a profit-maximizing monopoly sells a product with positive network externalities and optimally screen buyers' network information: their susceptibility (out-degree) and influence (in-degree). We characterize the optimal allocation for both the case of directed networks where each buyer's influence and susceptibility are independent, and the case of undirected networks where the two are identical. In the case of directed networks, we show the optimal allocation can only depend on a buyer's susceptibility and linear in virtual type (susceptibility) with quadratic intrinsic value. In the case of undirected networks, we disentangle the different effects of influence and susceptibility on optimal allocation and show with quadratic intrinsic value, the allocation is a linear combination of a buyer's type and virtual type. Then we contrast the model with complete information pricing and pure screening and show that apart from the screening effects, positive network externalities increase each buyer's allocation at the optimal selling mechanism. We also extend the model to accommodate for weak positive affiliation between a buyer's influence and susceptibility, and the situation where influence and susceptibility are endogenous to the optimal allocation.
104. December 20, 2018, Thursday
- Speaker: Prof. Hu, Wuyang (Ohio State University)
- Title: 受偿意愿估值中的虚拟误差:基于荟萃分析和实地实验的证据
- Time: 10:00--11:30
- Venue: A204
- Chair: Dr. Cui, Jingbo
- Abstract: 虚拟误差是所有学者在收集原始数据时需要注意并解决的问题。传统观点认为“受偿意愿”估值法会导致大范围虚拟误差,以致近几十年来受偿意愿估值法备受学界冷落。本文梳理超过500篇学术论文,最终通过以84项研究进行的荟萃分析揭示,学界维持了几十年的观点很有可能是被一篇结论极端的论文所影响,在剔除这篇论文的影响后,与“支付意愿”估值法相比,受偿意愿估值法本身并不会导致更大的虚拟误差。在此基础上,本文进行了一项专门实地实验,实验结果验证了荟萃分析得到的结论。
103. December 18, 2018, Tuesday
- Speaker: Ms. Jia, Xiao (ESSEC Business School)
- Title: Knowledge Transfer and Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
- Time: 14:00--15:30
- Venue: A208
- Chair: Dr. Li, Xiaoxi
- Abstract: This paper investigates the role of innovation characteristics and cultural distance in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Firms face a trade-off problem in the decision of cross-border M&As: they benefit from acquiring complementary knowledge in cross-border M&As, but face the cost arising from cultural distance. Using a unique patent-merger dataset for international firms from 2000 to 2016, I find that technology overlap and knowledge complementarity between firm pairs positively affects the incidence of cross-border deals. This relationship diminishes when the cultural distances between the firms’ country pairs are too long. Finally, I show that cross-border deals with more technology overlap and smaller cultural distance are associated with higher merger synergies and post-merger patent output.
102. December 18, 2018, Tuesday
- Speaker: Mr. Duan, Kun (University of Southampton)
- Title: Memory and Dynamic Co-movements in Housing Prices and Macroeconomic Fundamentals: A Fractionally Cointegrated VAR Approach
- Time: 10:00--11:30
- Venue: A208
- Chair: Dr. Wei, Lijia
- Abstract: Modelling possible slow-convergence of shocks within a complex interactive system is crucial as it provides a robust predictive power by quantifying the extent to which estimated macroeconomic effects are meaningful for a policy design. In this spirit, we introduce a long-memory cointegration approach to unravel distinct effect-transmission channels through which housing market and macroeconomic system co-moves. By employing a fractionally cointegrated VAR model for a quarterly dataset of the US from 1975Q1 to 2016Q1, we demonstrate that there is a gradual price adjustment towards the housing market clearing while the effects of shocks on equilibrium adjustments are inherently slow and non-linear. This identification strategy is able to not only gauge impacts of housing demand- or supply-exclusive variables, but also the ones that have dual roles through both the demand and supply sides, respectively, in equilibrium housing price determinations and dis-equilibrium error corrections. Eventually, an overall equilibrium housing price determination function is derived by solving the simultaneous housing demand and supply functions. Robustness checks that apply rational restrictions to unrestricted FCVAR estimations further confirm our results.
101. November 12, 2018, Monday
- Speaker: Dr. He, Wei (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
- Title: Dynamic Project Assignment
- Time: 10:30--11:30
- Venue: A208
- Chair: Dr. Sun, Xiang
- Abstract: We consider a project assignment problem where a Principal needs to assign multiple projects to a long-lived Agent. The Agent is privately informed about her cost, which evolves stochastically over time. To fully characterize the optimal mechanism, we identify the key trade-off of the Principal, which is the comparison between the benefit from an immediate assignment at high cost and the payoff from a delayed assignment at low cost. We show that the capacity constraint can reduce the payoff of the Principal and create a “hold-up” problem by comparing the limit of the optimal payoffs of the Principal when the capacity constraint is present, with the Principal's optimal payoff when the capacity constraint is absent.
100. November 2, 2018, Friday
- Speaker: Dr. Fan, Haichao (Fudan University)
- Title: Trade Liberalization and Decentralization of State-Owned Enterprises: Evidence from China
- Time: 14:30--16:30
- Venue: A421
- Chair: Dr. Cui, Jingbo
- Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between trade liberalization and SOEs probability to be decentralized, using detailed customs and firm-level data from China. We show that input tariff cuts significantly lower the probability of SOE’s being decentralized, whereas output tariff cuts raise this probability. We also find that as the distance from an SOE to its owner (a certain level of government) increases, the effect of input and output tariff cuts on the probability of SOEs decentralization become stronger. Further, the impact of the input tariff cuts dominates that of the output tariff cuts, because most of China’s imports are intermediate goods. Our empirical results are consistent with a simple model featuring a balance between governmental oversight cost and profits extracted from SOEs to explain why governments decide to decentralize SOEs.
99. October 25, 2018, Thursday
- Speaker: Dr. Wang, Tong (The University of Edinburgh)
- Title: Economics and Corporate Finance in the World of Blockchain
- Time: 10:00--11:30
- Venue: A208
- Chair: Dr. Li, Xiaoxi
- Abstract: This talk aims to give a brief introduction about the principle and mechanism of blockchain that may be of interest for economists and social scientists. It will also describe a game-theoretical framework of Initial Coin Offering and the points that the regulatory agencies may concern. Finally, some potential research topics with blockchain implementation will be addressed, which make a connection between the theory of corporate finance and the industrial practice.
98. September 19, 2018, Wednesday
- Speaker: Dr. Feng, Xin (University of International Business and Economics)
- Title: Information Disclosure in All-pay Auctions with Costly Entry
- Time: 14:00--15:30
- Venue: B247
- Chair: Dr. Shen, Bo
- Abstract: In this paper, we accommodate costly entry of contestants and examine the optimal information disclosure in a two-player all-pay contest. The contest organizer commits to an information policy to disclose the characteristics of the contest prize before contestants make their entry decisions. With free entry, we show that full concealment always induces higher aggregate effort than full disclosure policy, due to the property of "full rent dissipation".However, by taking into account costly entry, full disclosure could dominate full concealment policy by attracting contestants. entries.We further consider random disclosure and identify the optimal degree of transparency. Depending on the range of entry cost, full disclosure, full concealment, and random disclosure policies could be optimal. In particular, it is ex ante optimal for the contest organizer to commit to a more transparent information policy as the entry cost rises. Our results indicate that entry incentive plays a crucial role in the design of information disclosure.
97. September 3, 2018, Monday
- Speaker: Dr. Wang, Yun (Xiamen University) and Dr. Lee, Jong Jae (Wuhan University)
- Title: Bayesian Persuasion: Theory and Applications
- Time: 09:00--12:00
- Venue: B247
- Chair: Dr. Li, Xiaoxi
- Abstract: This mini course covers several topics on Bayesian persuasion theory and its applications. In the main part of this lecture, Prof. Yun Wang first presents the basic model of Bayesian persuasion à la Kamenica and Gentzkow (AER 2011) and then talks about the extension to the situations of multiple receivers and of privately informed receivers. At the end, Prof. Jong Jae Lee discusses an application of the Bayesian persuasion model to the advertising problems in the marketing science.